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Abstract
We study factors affecting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)
receiving loans and the effect of these loans on MSMEs performance. We study two
types of loans – a new type based on cash flows and a traditional-style loan based
on collateral. We use unique surveys of MSMEs from Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia and
Ukraine. We find that MSMEs receiving a cash flow or collateral loan in the past are
more likely to receive the same type of loan (and larger sized) in the future and that
cash flow loans may be the preferred form of credit. Both types of loans are related
positively to most performance indicators, enabling the MSMEs for instance to be
more profitable and expand production. The cash flow loans also appear to be par-
ticularly attractive credit delivery schemes for micro and small enterprises. Finally,
the effects of the smallest loans are often negative, suggesting that the minimum
loan size is an important policy issue.
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1. Introduction
Due to the important contribution that entrepreneurs and micro, small and med-
ium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) make to economic growth, innovation and employ-
ment creation, researchers and policymakers emphasize the need for a better
understanding of the factors influencing the rise and performance of these firms.
Academic research has identified limitations to the availability of finance for MSMEs
constraining firms’ performance, such as informational asymmetries between bor-
rowers and lenders, lack of credit history on the part of many MSMEs, poor legal
and institutional infrastructure, scarcity of appropriate credit skills in banks and
economies of scale in lending. In this article, we analyse the effects of the provision
of two types of bank credit to MSMEs in transition economies on firm performance –
a new type of loan based on cash flow and traditional-style loans based on collateral
(fixed assets and movable assets such as cars).
Before the 2001–2004 period covered by our study, standard bank credit to
MSMEs in the transition economies was very limited, with microenterprises obtain-
ing virtually no credit. The few firms that benefited from bank credit had to provide
large amounts of collateral and sometimes had to use a series of short-term loans to
finance longer-term capital investments.2 In most cases, the type of collateral
accepted by financial institutions was not available to MSMEs. There was hence an
important gap in the financial market.3
To overcome the problem of a lack of collateral on the part of MSMEs, govern-
ments, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) established new programmes to support the delivery of (cash flow based)
credit to MSMEs. The rationale was to support the creation of sustainable and com-
mercially viable microfinance channels. These programmes focused on reducing
lending costs, lowering banks’ perceptions of risk associated with MSME borrow-
ers, improving banks’ screening methodology and helping these borrowers build a
credit history. The ultimate objective was the easing of credit constraints of
MSMEs.
Interestingly, while the objectives of MSME lending programmes are widely
accepted as being important, little evidence is available regarding their impact (see
Brown et al., 2002; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Morduch, 1999). Most evaluations have
been monitoring exercises relying on the perceptions of the beneficiaries of the pro-
grammes. Those evaluations do not satisfactorily address the issue of selection bias,
that is, the problem that the observed performance of the beneficiaries may not be
attributable solely to the programme, but also to predetermined characteristics of
the firms that allowed them to be selected into the programmes. Since inherently
2 Using survey data from Kosovo, Krasniqi (2010) evaluates the determinants of small firms receiving a loan.
He shows that collateral is the main indicator on the basis of which banks make their lending decisions.
3 See for instance Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar (2003) for an analysis of the objectives and constraints of
entrepreneurs in transition economies.
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better performing MSMEs are more likely to be selected into the programmes, the
impact of programmes is normally over-estimated.4
More recent evaluations strive to eliminate the selection bias by using statistical
techniques such as difference-in-differences, difference-in-differences-in-differences
and instrumental variables (IVs).5 In some cases, researchers have used other quasi-
experimental techniques,6 such as trying to assess the impact of microfinance pro-
grammes by comparing the impact on repeat clients of a microfinance programme
to that on new clients, where new clients are the control group and repeat clients
constitute the treatment group.7 This methodology has potentially serious shortcom-
ings, however, in that it omits dropouts from the analysis (see, for example, discus-
sion in Karlan, 2001).8 Alternatively, Coleman (1999) utilized pipeline matching,
whereby borrowers’ performance is compared to that of clients who sign up to par-
ticipate in a future lending programme and thus undergo the same selection as cur-
rent borrowers. Although appealing, this methodology may yield a biased estimate
of the true impact in the presence of the Ashenfelter dip effect (in other words, the
pre-programme performance of the control group may be affected by the expecta-
tion of being in the programme).9 Bah et al. (2011) evaluate the effect of technical
and financial aid in Macedonia. They use matching techniques to address the selec-
tion bias and find that the assistance improves firms’ employment growth.
In this article, we are fortunate to have obtained access to client data from banks
participating in microfinance programmes of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (the EBRD) for an ex post analysis.10 The EBRD is among the
key institutions introducing and supporting the commercially based credit
4 See, for example, Mosley (1998).
5 See, for example, Banerjee and Duflo (2004); LeLarge et al. (2008); Storey (2000). These studies control for the
effect of observed variables that affect the outcome and may be correlated with participation in the pro-
gramme by including these variables as regressors in the estimation equation predicting the outcome, match-
ing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that are similar in observed characteristics, or modelling how selection
into a programme occurs and how it is correlated with unobserved variables. Other analytical evaluations use
randomly selected groups of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Gine et al. (2006) for instance discuss a
recently launched randomized impact evaluation of a microfinance programme in the Philippines.
6 Karlan and Goldberg (2006) provide a useful survey of studies examining the impact of microfinance pro-
grammes, products and policies carried out with the randomized trials methodology and quasi-experimental
designs.
7 This approach has been used in impact evaluations funded by USAID through its AIMS project.
8 Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2009) for instance find that by including dropouts in the analysis the esti-
mated impact of microfinance is greatly reduced. They compare the different results of the impact evaluation
of a microfinance programme in Peru with and without dropouts in the sample. The analysis excluding drop-
outs found a positive impact of credit on profits, household income and firm employment. The analysis
including dropouts found a negative impact of credit on firm profits, and a reduced positive impact on house-
hold income and firm employment.
9 Coleman (1999) found no impact of credit on the performance of clients and prospective clients of a microfi-
nance programme in Thailand.
10 At the time, a randomized ex ante evaluation approach was not feasible because the financial intermediaries
perceived the cost of randomized provision of credit to be too high relative to the potential benefits.
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programmes targeting MSMEs in the Eastern European region. The EBRD intro-
duced cash flow-based lending that uses a more flexible definition of collateral,
therefore reaching out to a larger number of firms. The EBRD programme provided
financial incentives to banks (in the form of credit lines granted at a discounted rate)
to use this new cash flow-based approach in lending to small borrowers and it also
aimed at building credit skills for MSME lending in existing commercial banks and
newly established specialized banks known as microfinance banks.
To carry out our analysis, we administered a survey in 2005 to a sample of (a)
MSMEs that had received a loan from one of eight EBRD-sponsored MSME lending
projects in 2002, and (b) similar MSMEs that had never received an EBRD project
loan. The latter sample represents our control group. In both groups, some firms
had received loans from non-EBRD sources during our sample period and some
had not. In the survey, we have data on performance indicators and all loans (both
cash flow and collateral loans) that the firms obtained during 2001–2004.
There are two key questions that we address. First, what factors determine
whether MSMEs receive collateral loans or cash flow loans? Second, what is the
effect of the cash flow vs. collateral credit on MSME performance? We use several
indicators of firm performance: capital (fixed assets) formation, revenues, employ-
ment and profit.11 We conduct our analyses on all firms taken together, as well as
on specific size groups: micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, defined as firms
with 1–5 employees (including the self-employed and working family members),
6–15 employees and 16 or more employees, respectively.
We find that firms that received a given (cash flow or collateral) loan in the past
are more likely to receive the same type of loan, and also a larger loan of the same
type, in the future. Having received a cash flow loan in the past has a negative effect
on the probability of receiving a collateral loan in the future, while the corresponding
negative cross-effect from receiving collateral loans in the past on the probability of
receiving a cash flow loan is statistically insignificant for micro and small firms. Esti-
mates based on the entire sample suggest that both the cash flow and collateral loans
have a positive relationship with fixed asset formation, suggesting that firms use
bank loans for investment in fixed capital. In terms of dollars of fixed assets generated
by a dollar of loan, the effects of the two types of loans are similar. The positive effect
of both types of loans is by and large also found with respect to revenues, and
employment. In particular, the overall estimates for all firms indicate that the loans
serve the purpose of enabling theMSMEs to expand production beyond the scale that
they could have achieved without this source of credit. In the overall sample, the two
types of loans are also found to have a positive effect on profitability. We find that the
above pattern holds across the size groups of firms, but some estimated effects (espe-
cially those for micro firms and to a lesser extent medium-sized firms) are statistically
11 Berger and Udell’s (2006) work highlights the fact that programmes providing credit through different
lending methodologies are likely to yield different outcomes and should not be treated as a homogeneous set
of providers.
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less significant. Finally, our estimates suggest that while most cash flow and collat-
eral loans have a positive effect on the growth of fixed assets, revenues, employment
and net profit, in many cases the effects of the smallest loans are negative.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the MSME financing pro-
jects whose impact we evaluate, while Section 3 discusses the main features of the
survey and basic statistics. Section 4 outlines the analytical framework, Section 5
presents the empirical results and Section 6 contains the conclusions. Appendix 1
provides descriptive statistics on the treatment and control firms across size groups,
while Appendix 2 presents information on the banks that provided cash flow credit.
2. Objectives and structure of the evaluated MSME projects
The EBRD financing projects are structured as loans to banks and other financial insti-
tutions that use the EBRD loans to extend loans to MSME borrowers. The EBRD cou-
ples these loans to banks with a technical assistance programme through which the
banks acquire new lending methodologies that are appropriate for dealing with a
large number of small borrowers in an environment with underdeveloped institu-
tional andfinancial infrastructure. The EBRDprojects result in individualMSME loans
that are extended on the basis of risk considerations and borrowers’ ability to repay
the loan (measured as a percentage of their cash flow projections).12 Banks not partici-
pating in the EBRD programmes have instead been extending loans to small borrow-
ers using a traditional collateral lendingmethodology. The cash flow approach allows
local banks to extend a large number of loans and in a short loan-processing time.
From Table 1, we see that the number of days to receive a loan is statistically signifi-
cantly lower for cash flow loans than for collateral loans. The short processing time in
turn permits MSMEs to access credit when they need it. The EBRD programmes pro-
vide no subsidy to the MSMEs. The effective interest rates charged by the EBRD pro-
grammes are on average in line with the market rates charged by other banks. From
Table 1, we can see that cash flow loans in fact charge slightly higher interest rates. In
terms of collateral requirements, however, the banks in the EBRD programmes accept
as collateral almost anything that ‘matters to the borrower’ to provide the borrower
with an incentive to repay the loan, but not to protect itself in case of default. The use
of collateral in these loans is in fact purely for incentive purposes because the net reve-
nue that the bankmight obtain from the sale of such flexible collateral would be negli-
gible but the potential loss to the borrower would often exceed the value of the loan.
FromTable 1,we see that themean percentage of loan provided as collateralwas simi-
lar for the two types of loans in 2001,while in 2004 the treatment firmswere pledging a
higher share of collateral for both types of loans comparedwith control firms.
The EBRD operates through de novo dedicated microfinance banks as well as
existing local commercial banks. The microfinance banks are set up by both private
12 The main variable of interest is the leverage ratio of the borrower.
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and public shareholders. The rationale for establishing them has been to create a reli-
able, permanent delivery mechanism for MSME finance. Normally, 90 percent of the
microfinance banks’ loans have to be below a US$ 10,000 threshold, with the remain-
ing 10 percent going up to about US$ 200,000. Because of the high fixed costs of
extending and monitoring loans, the larger loans account for a larger share of profits.
However, the average size of the loans of these banks is kept well below the US$
10,000 threshold.
The local banks, attracted by the profitability of the cash flow-based lending
financed through the EBRD loans, have gradually started utilizing their own funds
to provide cash flow loans. The assignment of clients of local banks to the cash flow
programme is carried out at the branch level. As loan officers get trained in the cash
flow methodology in a bank branch, all clients requesting very small loans are allo-
cated to the cash flow programme. There is also no possibility of shifting specific cli-
ents from one bank branch to another as MSMEs are allocated to branches
according to their geographical proximity to the branch. There is hence generally no
incentive to allocate good quality clients to either the collateral or cash flow
lending.13
The beneficiaries of cash flow programmes are private entrepreneurs and firms,
ranging from self-employed one-person businesses to companies with up to 100
employees. Loans start as low as US$ 20 (for example, for an open bakery on a Cen-
tral Asian market to buy flour) up to about US$ 200,000 (for example, for the pur-
chase of upholstery equipment for a furniture producer in Ukraine).
3. The survey, sample and basic statistics
During the first half of 2005, we administered a questionnaire to a sample of 1,272
MSMEs (defined as firms with fewer than 250 employees) in Bulgaria, Georgia, Rus-
sia and Ukraine.14 In each country, these MSMEs represent a stratified random
13 In one of the eight programmes, there was however a potential incentive for a bank to allocate loan appli-
cants non-randomly between the cash flow and collateral loans. In the case of Hebros Bank in Bulgaria, there
may have been an incentive to shift the best clients from the collateral to the cash flow portfolio of loans
because Hebros Bank received a credit line from EU/EBRD SME Facility to provide loans to MSMEs. EBRD
offered a discount on the interest charged on this credit line. We have therefore checked whether the estimates
based on data from Hebros Bank differed from others and found that the Hebros and other estimates were not
statistically different from one another.
14 The selection of countries in which the survey was run was based on a number of criteria: First, the number
of loans extended by each financial intermediary in the EBRD programme being at least 250; second, to allow
for a comparison of the impact on MSMEs of the different quality of finance provided by different types of
financial intermediaries, the presence of both dedicated microfinance institution and existing local banks
administering targeted credit lines; finally, in the case of large countries, an overlap of selected regions with
regions in which the 2002 BEEPS was run, as the firms in the control group were selected from the BEEPS sam-
ple. (BEEPS is a survey of over 9,500 companies in 26 transition countries and Turkey. See European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (2005) for details.
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sample of manufacturing, trade and other service sector enterprises that in 2002
received finance from the EBRD’s MSME financial intermediaries (the treatment
group that represents roughly two thirds of the overall sample per country) and
enterprises that by the time of the survey had not received finance from the EBRD
intermediaries, but were in existence in 2002 (the control group comprising about
one third of the overall sample per country). The treatment group firms were
selected as a random sample stratified by employment size and sector.15 The control
group comprises firms that are matched to the treatment group by location, employ-
ment size and sector.
Although no quotas were applied to specific sectors, in practice most inter-
viewed enterprises are in the (broadly defined) trade sector because a majority of
companies that borrowed from the banks in question are in this sector. Microenter-
prises constitute the bulk of the loan portfolio. In the case of microfinance institu-
tions and micro-lending programmes through participating banks, microenterprises
account on average for two thirds of the volume and 90 percent of the number of
loans.16 As the role of microenterprises in financial intermediaries’ portfolios is so
large, this is reflected in the size of sample strata by size class.17 Since we wanted to
analyse the impact of cash flow vs. collateral finance on enterprises of all sizes, we
aimed at having all size classes represented in the sample. Yet, due to total sample
size limitations, in some cases the sample stratification does not match exactly the
financial intermediaries’ portfolio composition, although it does reflect the domi-
nance of micro firms in the banks’ portfolio by giving a larger weight to microenter-
prises (54 percent of total number of surveyed enterprises) than to small (36 percent)
or medium-sized enterprises (10 percent).
Table 2 shows the sample composition by size class and sector for both control
and treatment groups. The control group firms were selected in 2005 as a stratified
random sample from marketing lists, internet databases, yellow pages and inter-
viewers’ walk-ins to match the treatment group in each country by categories of
location, employment size and sector.18
15 Except for Ukraine it was not possible to find sufficient enterprises in the largest employment category as
most of the banks working for the EBRD did not extend a sufficient number of loans to this category of enter-
prises. Also in the case of TUB in Georgia, it was impossible to interview the specified quota of 100 enterprises
per each bank due to the small number of loans extended by this bank in 2002 combined with business failures
and inability to reach the enterprises which benefited from TUB loans. This failure was compensated by add-
ing more enterprises from the Procredit Bank in Georgia. In Bulgaria, the Hebros Bank and Procredit Bank
had several inaccurate contact entries and the sample was hence drawn with replacement.
16 In the case of Hebros Bank, these data are unknown as monitoring of the use of the proceeds of the Facility
is based on its subloans’ size rather than on its subborrowers’ size.
17 Quotas were specified for the size composition of the sample of enterprises to be interviewed (50 percent of
the sample had to employ up to 9 employees, 20 percent between 10 and 24 employees, 15 percent between 25
and 49 employees, and 15 percent between 50 and 249 employees).
18 The matching was not on a one-to-one basis, but by categories of location, size and sector. All firms from
Georgia and Russia came from one location – Tbilisi and Nizhniy Novgorod, respectively.
 2013 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2013 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
278 Cassano , Joeveer and Svejnar
The summary statistics of the key variables used in our analysis are provided in
Table 3. All variables have reasonable values and display considerable variation
over time. Given that the matching of the control group to the treatment group was
structured around location, employment size and sector of the firms, other variables
show a larger variation. The summary statistics across size groups are presented in
Appendix 1. The number of loans is evenly distributed across size classes for cash
flow loans while more loans are granted to larger companies in the case of collateral
loans. This is consistent with the notion that the traditional banking approach pre-
fers to issue loans to bigger rather than smaller businesses. From Table 1, we can see
that collateral loans have a larger average loan size than cash flow loans in 2004, also
collateral loans received by control firms in 2001 were larger than loans received by
treatment firms.
Table 2. Number of firms by employment and sector in 2004
Number of employees Sector
1–5 6–15 16–249 Trade Industry Service Total
Bulgaria
Treatment group 47 73 80 97 68 35 200
Control group 25 42 53 34 41 45 120
Total 72 115 133 131 109 80 320
Georgia
Treatment group 115 58 31 139 34 31 204
Control group 54 32 27 54 34 25 113
Total 169 91 58 193 68 56 317
Russia
Treatment group 49 85 86 142 28 50 220
Control group 38 42 35 75 25 15 115
Total 87 127 121 217 53 65 335
Ukraine
Treatment group 68 56 76 103 80 17 200
Control group 23 35 42 49 41 10 100
Total 91 91 118 152 121 27 300
All countries
Treatment group 279 272 273 481 210 133 824
Control group 140 151 157 212 141 95 448
Total 419 423 430 693 351 228 1,272
Notes: Treatment group consists of MSMEs that had received a loan from one of eight EBRD-sponsored
MSME lending projects in 2002. Control group consists of MSMEs that had never received an EBRD project
loan.
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Given our survey design, we do not observe any exit of firms. We do know the
failure rate among the firms that received EBRD credit in 2002. The failure rate from
2002 to 2005 was less than 10 percent for firms in Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine, and
it was slightly above 10 percent for firms in Georgia. For our comparison group of
firms, we do not have the failure statistics and we therefore cannot compare directly
the survival rates of the treatment and the control group of firms. However, to carry
out this type of comparison, we selected another control group for this purpose,
namely the enterprises that were surveyed by BEEPS survey in the 2002 and 2005
waves. We can get the average attrition rates by country, which are around 15 per-
cent, except for Georgia where the exit rate is 25 percent. In the BEEPS survey, we
can also split the firms into those that received credit and those that did not. Interest-
ingly, we observe almost no failure among the credit-receiving Bulgarian and
Table 3. Summary statistics
Control group Treatment group
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
2001
Revenue 430 65 2,674 193 61 522
Investment 14 0 64 12 2 48
Fixed assets 117 9 759 55 9 207
Net profit 44 7 146 54 10 286
Total employment 18 7 35 12 5 26
Leverage 7 0 16 7 0 15
Number of firms with independent auditors 87 90
Number of firms 401 779
2004
Revenue 549 69 2,466 335 77 1,389
Investment 26 1 125 24 3 89
Fixed assets 125 11 538 87 14 308
Net profit 64 8 234 114 13 1,160
Total employment 19 8 33 19 8 34
Leverage 8 0 17 14 4 21
Number of firms with independent auditors 148 123
Number of firms 448 824
Notes: Treatment group consists of MSMEs that had received a loan from one of eight EBRD-sponsored
MSME lending projects in 2002. Control group consists of MSMEs that had never received an EBRD project
loan. Financial data are expressed in thousands of US dollars. Figures are adjusted to producer prices. For all
countries the country specific producer price index is used except for Russia for which the Nizhny Novgorod
regional producer price index is used. Total employment is a full time equivalent of full-time, part-time and
temporary employees. Leverage is defined as ratio of debt to debt plus equity.
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Russian firms, while the failure rate among the credit receivers in Georgia and Uk-
raine is higher than the average (around 35 percent). Using the BEEPS sample as a
control group has a significant drawback, however, in that we are not able to exclude
the possibility that some of the loan recipients within the BEEPS group were clients
of the EBRD funded programmes for financing MSMEs. Overall, it seems that treat-
ment firms are less prone to failure. Hence, our sampled firms may be better per-
formers than the average firm in a country (this distinction is even more pronounced
with respect to the control group of the firms since their failure rates were higher).
4. Analytical framework
In carrying out our analysis, we need to take into account the fact that our sampled
firms differ as to whether they received a cash flow loan in 2002 and also whether
and when they received other loans. In particular, firms in the treatment group may
have received other cash flow or collateral loans before and after 2002, while firms
in the control group may have received collateral loans at any time. From an analyti-
cal standpoint there may hence be a selection problem, with better performing firms
for instance being more able to obtain cash flow and/or collateral loans. If one did
not control for this non-random assignment of firms to loans, one could mistakenly
attribute the superior post-2002 performance to loans rather than recognizing that
part may be due to inherently superior performance of the firms that receive loans.
In view of the design of our sample, we are able to control for the treatment and per-
formance of different firms up to 2002, and then focus on analysing the impact of
subsequent cash flow and collateral loans on performance.
4.1 Determinants of receiving a loan
The probability that a firm receives a cash flow or collateral loan, respectively, is
predicted by two dummy variables indicating whether the firm received a cash flow
or collateral loan 2 years earlier, a dummy variable reflecting whether the firm had
an independent auditor 2 years before a loan was granted, and a continuous vari-
able reflecting the firm’s initial leverage in 2001:19
CFit ¼ aþ bCFit2 þ cCLit2 þ dAuditorit2 þ /Leveragei2001 þ eit; ð1Þ
CLit ¼ aþ bCFit2 þ cCLit2 þ dAuditorit2 þ /Leveragei2001 þ eit; ð2Þ
where CFit (CLit) is a dummy variable which assumes value 1 if a cash flow (collateral)
loan is awarded to firm i in year t and 0 in all other cases, Auditor is a dummy variable
19 Using dummy variables for the initial (2000 or 2001) loan status instead of the 2-year lagged loan status
yields similar results.
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equal to 1 if firms had an independent auditor, Leverage is a ratio of debt to debt plus
equity and eit is an error term. We also control for country effects, industry effects and
time effects. We apply a logit estimation procedure to evaluate Equations (1) and (2).
In alternative specifications, we use the amount of loan received as a dependent
variable and we use the same set of determinants to predict the size of loan received.
We apply a Tobit estimation procedure.
4.2 The effects of loans on performance
Formally, in the spirit of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Heckman and Hotz (1989),
and Hanousek et al. (2007), we specify a panel-data procedure. Let Xit be a given
performance indicator, with subscript i denoting an individual firm and t denoting
year (t goes from 2001 to 2004). A simple model of performance may be specified in
the form of an annual rate of change (first-difference of logs) of the dependent vari-
able as
D lnXit ¼ aþ b lnXi2001 þ cCFit1 þ dCLit1 þ eit; ð3Þ
where eit is the error term. Our interest is in estimating the c of cash flow loans and
d of collateral loans obtained in the 2002–2004 period. In empirical estimations of
Equation (3), we also control for country effects, industry effects and time effects.
Note that Equation (3) is relatively flexible and that it takes firms that received no
loans as the base, permitting their percentage change in performance to vary over
time at the rate a + b lnXi2001. In addition, Equation (3) controls for the effects on
performance of any fixed differences among all firms.20 A particular concern is that
we should ensure that our estimates capture the effect of loans rather than other
factors such as competition. As may be seen from Equation (3), we do so by con-
trolling for these other factors by the initial (2001) performance and by including
the aforementioned country, industry and time effects. Finally, we also allow for
two specifications of the effect of the two types of credit: one where the effect does
not vary with the amount of credit and one where the effect of credit varies with
loan size.
There are three key econometric issues that we need to account for in our analy-
sis: omitted variables bias, measurement error, and endogeneity/selection of receiv-
ing loans. We address omitted variables bias by including a number of important
control variables described above. With respect to measurement error in loans, per-
formance and other variables, we note that the error can induce attenuation bias as
well as more complicated biases in estimated coefficients. Being aware of this prob-
lem, in collecting the dataset we placed particular emphasis on identifying precisely
20 Note that we have also estimated the effects of loans on the level (as opposed to the rate of change) of per-
formance and found these effects to be statistically insignificant and their exclusion not to materially affect the
other parameter estimates.
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individual loans, as well as carefully collecting several indicators of performance for
the current and preceding periods. In this respect, our survey is of higher quality
than many other surveys in this area. Our emphasis on collecting high quality infor-
mation is also reflected in the relatively high response rate (38 percent) that we have
generated from firms for our questionnaires. Finally, we also checked that there are
no outliers that would seriously affect our estimates.
As to endogeneity/selection of receiving loans, there is a danger that the inher-
ently superior performance of the firms selected for receiving cash flow or collateral
loans could be attributed to loans rather than the possibly non-random assignment
of firms to loans. We address this problem as follows. First, we match the control
group firms with the treatment group on the three observable characteristics dis-
cussed above. Second, we use the panel data specification in Equation (3) with the
aforementioned covariates as controls. This controls for the possibility that firms are
not assigned to loans at random and that lending institutions may give loans to
firms that are inherently superior or inferior performers. In addition, our survey
includes questions with regard to business constraints. One of the constraints that
firms were asked about was the availability of financing from banks. The response
to this question was statistically indifferent for treatment and control group firms.
This allows us to assume that fewer loans in the control group were the firms’
choice. Also, the treatment firms considered the cost of financing as a more severe
constraint than did the control firms. This again suggests that control firms were not
treated worse than the treated firms with respect to firm financing.
5. The empirical results
We present our empirical estimates in three parts. First, we discuss the results
related to the determinants of the probability that a firm receives a cash flow or col-
lateral loan. Second, we examine the effects of the presence of cash flow and collat-
eral loans on MSME performance, irrespective of the size of these loans. We carry
out this estimation for all firms together and separately by firm size, using the three
size categories of firms corresponding to micro, small and medium-sized firms.21
Finally, we examine the extent to which the effects of loans vary by loan size.
In Panel A of Table 4, we report marginal effects of a logit estimation relating the
probability of receiving a cash flow or collateral loan in a given year to the explana-
tory variables in Equations (1) and (2). In Panel B, we report Tobit estimates related
to the size of the loan as the dependent variable. In all tables, we first present
21 The firms are split into size classes based on employment in year 2002. Our data show that allowing all the
regression coefficients to be different (i.e. running separate regressions) in the three size categories of firms is
statistically superior to constraining all coefficients to be the same and allowing only the loan effect to vary by
firm size (i.e. by interacting loan with size). We therefore run separate regressions. The two approaches yield
similar results.
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estimates for all firms taken together and then separate estimates for each of the
three firm size categories.22
As may be seen from Table 4, the 2-year lagged loan variables have a strong
explanatory power, indicating that firms that received a given (cash flow or collat-
eral) loan in the past are more likely to receive the same type of loan, and also a lar-
ger size loan of the same type, in the future. The effect of having received a cash
flow loan in the past has a negative effect on receiving a collateral loan in the future,
however, and this effect is significant for all firm size categories. The same negative
cross-effect is seen for past collateral loans on current cash flow loans for the sample
as a whole and for medium-sized firms, but it is insignificant for micro and small
firms. We discuss the implication of these findings below.
The presence of an independent auditor increases the probability that firms
receive collateral loans and it also has a positive effect on the size of collateral loans,
although this positive effect is statistically insignificant in some of the subsamples.
On the other hand, the presence of an independent auditor reduces the probability
that firms receive a cash flow loan and the size of this type of a loan, with this nega-
tive effect also not being statistically significant in some of the subsamples. Overall,
it appears that banks that rely on the collateral method of assessing creditworthiness
view favourably the presence of independent auditors, while banks relying on the
cash flow method tend to ignore or even discount the presence of independent audi-
tors.23 Leverage in 2001 has a positive effect on the probability of firms getting a col-
lateral loan and on collateral loan size. On the whole, the explanatory variables have
a strong explanatory power in both sets of regressions. The pseudo R2s are in the
0.12–0.28 and 0.07–0.13 range, respectively.
The effects of loans on performance are presented in Tables 5–8. In each table,
we first give estimates from a model in which the performance effects of loans do
not vary with loan size and subsequently estimates from a model where the effect of
credit varies with loan size.
In Table 5, we report the effects of cash flow and collateral loans on the rate of
growth of fixed assets. In the first column of the table, the estimated average effects
of a loan, based on data for all firms, suggest that the award of a cash flow loan (col-
lateral loan) is related to a 10.7 (15.7) percentage point higher growth rate of fixed
assets of the firm. Since the collateral loans are on average three times as large as the
cash flow loans, the percentage effect per dollar of loan may be argued to be about
twice as high for the cash flow loans than collateral loans.24 However, since firms
receiving collateral loans are on average about twice as large as firms receiving cash
22 Note that these size categories give us a similar number of observations for each group and hence provide
a useful stratification for drawing inferences about the probability of obtaining a loan and the effects of loans
in micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.
23 Alternatively, it could be that firms with an independent auditor tend to be firms with good collateral and
hence have lesser need for cash flow loans. We thank the Editor for pointing this out.
24 The intuition here is that the 15.7 percentage effect would become one third (5.23 percentage effect) if the
size of the collateral loan were just one third of its size.
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flow loans, the effects of the two types of loans in terms of dollars of fixed assets
generated by a dollar of loan may be argued to be similar.25
The results based on firm size, reported in columns 2–4, indicate that both cash
flow and collateral loans have a positive relationship with capital formation of all
firm sizes. Moreover, for cash flow loans the percentage effect rises and becomes
more statistically significant with firm size, while the relationship with collateral
loans is more uniform. Overall, the results in the first part of Table 5 provide sup-
port for the anecdotal assertion that the award of a (relatively short term) loan is
associated with higher fixed assets growth.
The estimated effects of loan size on fixed assets are reported in the last four col-
umns of Table 5. The effects of cash flow loans on fixed assets vary systematically
with the size of the loan in all three types of firms, with the effect being negative for
small loans and becoming positive as loan size increases. The same pattern is
observed for collateral loans in small and medium-sized firms, while the effect in
micro firms does not vary significantly with loan size. As the calculated critical
(overtaking) values in the table indicate, for the sample as a whole the effect of cash
flow loans (collateral loans) on fixed assets turns from negative to positive at the
21st (3rd) percentile of the cash flow loan (collateral loan) size distribution.26 The
estimates from regressions based on firm size in turn suggest that the critical cash
flow loan values for micro, small and medium-sized firms are at the 25th, 9th and
21st percentile, respectively. The corresponding critical values of collateral loans for
small and medium-sized firms are at the 6th and 5th percentile, respectively. The
results hence suggest that most cash flow and collateral loans yield a positive rela-
tionship with growth of fixed assets. In most cases, the estimates also raise the issue
that very small loans may have a negative association with fixed asset formation. In
all regressions, the effect of the initial level of fixed assets is negative, as expected,
indicating that the data display conversion to the mean – a phenomenon that we
observe with respect to the other performance variables in the following tables as
well.
The average effects of cash flow and collateral loans on firm revenues and
employment growth are reported in Tables 6 and 7. On average, receiving a cash
flow loan is related to 4.5 percent higher rate of growth of revenue than would be
the case if the firm did not receive such a loan. The average effect of a collateral loan
is estimated at 8.3 percent. Both cash flow and collateral loans have a positive rela-
tionship with the rate of growth of employment as well (7.7 and 14 percent, respec-
tively). The estimated effects of cash flow and collateral loans in regressions based
on firm size (columns 2–4) are positive and mostly statistically significant for both
performance measures. The estimated effects of loans on revenues and employment
25 The effect may be argued to be similar in terms of dollars of fixed assets in the sense that the effect (of an
identically sized loan) is 5.23 percentage points for a firm with fixed assets twice as sizable as the fixed assets
corresponding to the firm facing the 10.7 percentage point loan effect.
26 The critical loan size values are reported only if either or both the loan dummy and the interaction of loan
dummy and loan size variable are statistically significant.
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are hence broadly consistent with the corresponding positive effect of loans on fixed
assets and they suggest that loan receivers become larger.
The estimated effects of the loan size on the rate of change of revenues and
employment indicate that the effects of loans are negative for small loans and
become positive as loan size increases. As with the effect on fixed assets, the results
across size categories indicate that most cash flow and collateral loans yield a posi-
tive effect on the growth of revenues and employment, but that in some firm size
categories the effect of the smallest loans may be negative. In estimations that we do
not report here, we have also found a positive effect of loans on labour costs. The
estimated coefficients from the labour cost regressions imply that the overall labour
cost effect of loans is primarily accounted for by the positive effect of loans on
employment rather than on wages (we can derive wage per employee from labour
cost and we can show that this was not affected by the loans received).27
Since revenues and costs are the two principal components of profit, we have
also examined directly the effect of loans on profit (see Table 8). We find that the
effect of the two types of loans on profitability is also positive and statistically signif-
icant (1st column of Table 8). Our results with respect to revenues and profit hence
suggest that receiving a loan is related to increased scale of operations and higher
profits.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) permits us
to draw two sets of interesting conclusions, one with respect to the allocation of
credit and one with respect to the effects on firm performance of two types of
loans – a new type of loan based on cash flow that was pioneered and spear-
headed by EBRD in the transition economies and a traditional-style loan based
on collateral.
With respect to the allocation of credit, we find that MSMEs that received a
cash flow or collateral loan in the past are more likely to receive the same type of
loan, and also a larger sized loan of the same type, in the future. This finding may
reflect the fact that firms that received a given loan in the past are more likely to
apply to the same lender and/or that the lender is more likely to lend to firms to
which he/she lent in the past. Interestingly, the effect of having received a cash
flow loan in the past has a negative effect on the probability of receiving a collat-
eral loan in the future, while the same negative cross-effect from receiving collat-
eral loans in the past on the probability of receiving a cash flow loan is statistically
27 A separate set of results is received by analysing the capital–labour ratio, which was proxied by the fixed
assets to total employment ratio. We found that receiving a loan has no significant effect on the change of this
variable. This confirms the finding that both fixed assets and employment are affected positively by loans and
we cannot find a larger tendency in one or in the other. These results are available on request.
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insignificant for micro and small firms. These results suggest that we observe a
mixture of two effects. First, it appears that cash flow loans are the preferred form
of credit in the sense that once MSMEs of any size receive this type of loan they
are more likely to receive another in the future and less likely to obtain a collateral
loan in the future. This hypothesis is also supported by the finding that micro and
small firms are unaffected in their probability of obtaining a cash flow loan in the
future by having received a collateral loan in the past. The second effect seems to
be that banks and clients develop a specific relationship that makes them more
likely to deal with each other over time and less likely to switch to another partner
(relationship banking). This may be viewed as a form of market segmentation and
it is consistent with findings based on US small and medium-sized firms. In partic-
ular, Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) findings suggest that bank relationships are valu-
able to small firms.
With respect to the effect of credit on performance, we show that both cash
flow loans and collateral loans are positively related to a number of key perfor-
mance indicators of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of microenter-
prises, the association of these loans with performance is also found to be
generally positive but somewhat less significant. Both types of loans have an over-
all positive relationship with fixed asset formation, suggesting that firms use both
types of bank loans for investment in fixed capital. In terms of dollars of fixed
assets generated by a dollar of loan, the effects of the two types of loans are
similar.
Both cash flow and collateral loans also by and large display a positive relation-
ship with revenues and employment. In particular, the overall estimates for all firms
indicate that the loans enable the MSMEs to expand production beyond the scale
that they could have achieved without this source of credit. Finally, there is also a
positive relationship between both types of loan and profitability.
Our estimates also suggest that while cash flow and collateral loans are posi-
tively related to various performance indicators, in many cases the performance
effects of the smallest size loans may be negative. This could be interpreted in two
different ways. First, that the microenterprises awarded with the smallest size loans
are the poorest and use loan proceeds for purposes defined as wasteful from an
enterprise point of view – that is, loan proceeds may be used to finance consump-
tion/survival of the entrepreneur’s household. Second, that the microenterprises
awarded with the smallest loans are first-time borrowers who are not as experienced
or as successful entrepreneurs as those who are awarded larger loans, and thus
might be less efficient in the use of funds made available to them. This finding has
implications for lending policies and deserves more in-depth investigation in future
research.
Finally, from the policy standpoint it is important to note that it is easier and fas-
ter for MSMEs to qualify for the cash flow loans than collateral loans. In our sample,
we also see that most of the collateral loans obtained by control firms have been
received by medium-sized firms, while the allocation of cash flow loans was
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relatively even across all the firm size groups. This suggests that cash flow loans can
play an important part in credit provision to micro and small enterprises that may
be overlooked by the traditional collateral-based loan providers. Overall, our data
and analysis suggest that the EBRD spearheaded programme of cash flow loans has
been a success.
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